The Reaction of the Jewish Public in Germany to the Nuremberg Laws
Source: A. Margaliot, ΓÇ£The Reaction of the Jewish Public in Germany to the Nuremberg LawsΓÇ¥, Yad Vashem Studies , Vol. 12, pp. 75 - 107
The discussions at this Zionist Convention reflect the state of confusion in, which the movement found itself.
While the leaders were aware of the need to get as many Jews as possible out of Germany, they were unable, under the prevailing conditions, to provide a haven in Palestine for such large numbers. This explains the equivocation of their stand, which is also reflected in the following words of Siegfried Moses: 'First among our claims is the demand that emigration should serve as the focal point of a general Jewish plan; but at the same time there is also a need to establish Jewish schools... and to strengthen our Jewish cultural roots.' 61 Thus, for want of an alternative, they grasped at the concept of autonomy. The need to develop cultural independence as a way of stabilising internal life was widely discussed in the ranks of the Z.V.f.D 62 . Various speakers stressed the need to invest considerable efforts in the study of Hebrew language and literature, and in furthering knowledge of contemporary Judaism and Jewish traditions. They sought to help the Jewish population, which had been detached from its wider environment, by strengthening its links with Judaism. Considerable thought was devoted to the Jewish schools, the reinforcement and expansion of, which was demanded by the delegates 63 . They sought to derive support from the strengthening of the spiritual links with the Land of Israel, and to provide the Jewish public with spiritual comfort through various artistic spheres, Jewish theatre in particular. Thus, just at this time the slogan of cultural autonomy became an accepted phrase in Zionist circles, and it appears to have been regarded by many as a solution in itself and not merely a temporary expedient.
The demand to replace the leaders of the Jewish community was raised in no uncertain terms at the Berlin Convention 64 . This, however, was no innovation. At various times in the past changes had been demanded in the central institutions and community boards, guaranteeing the Zionists a decisive voice in their management 65 . The publication of the Nuremberg Laws, however, seems to have given an added impetus to the critics of the veteran leadership, where the Zionists were in the minority. The resolution demanding a change in the leadership was placed first on the list of the Convention's resolutions and was phrased as an ultimatum: 'If this demand is not fulfilled the Zionist representatives will be removed from those bodies which refuse to comply.' 66 It was however not made clear just what were the changes to be implemented once the leadership had been replaced. It would appear that the Zionists' demand for the reinvigoration of the top echelon of Jewish leadership was more an expression of their aspiration for ideological reorientation than a reflection of any well-prepared plan of action for the future.
The Central Institutions
Let us first examine the declaration published by the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) shortly after the new legislation was introduced. It was phrased as follows: 'The laws promulgated by the Reichstag at Nuremberg have constituted a severe blow for German Jewry, but their object is to create the basis for a better relationship between the German and Jewish nations. The National Representation of Jews in Germany is prepared to contribute whatever it can to furthering this end. A precondition for better relations is the hope that by putting an end to the acts of degradation and the boycott the Jews and the Jewish communities of Germany will be able to exist, both morally and economically.' 67 The gist of this pronouncement by the representation was to make it clear that, it was first and foremost necessary to guarantee the conditions enabling most of the Jews to remain in Germany. This was the prince, which lay behind most of its policy. The Representation appears to have subscribed to the statements made by government representatives according to, which the Nuremberg Laws were designed to create a modus vivendi for Germans and Jews. 68 Consequently the authors of the statement demanded that a livelihood be guaranteed to the Jews and that the campaign of defamation, which they found injurious, should be stopped. In actual fact, there was nothing new in this claim. Ever since the establishment of the Third Reich the central Jewish institutions had waged a continual battle against the virulent attacks by the National Socialist Party's spokesmen and their press channels. They had repeatedly protested against the abuse directed at them by Julius Streicher and Joseph Goebbels 69 and against the various other kinds of anti-Semitic insults 70 . Their demand that the boycott against Jews be ended had also been voiced many times before 71 . Their claims were supported by the official policy of the Ministry of Economics, which at that time opposed ousting Jews from their livelihoods as it wished to prevent any shock to the national economy. When it transpired that the Nuremberg Laws did not include new economic restrictions, the Jewish institutions were doubly convinced that there was some chance of opposing the boycott as well as the other hostile actions, which had been mounted without official sanction.
The manifesto also contained other points, which merit attention. It comprised a demand to develop the network of Jewish education in order, 'to educate youth to be steadfast in its religious beliefs and proud of its Jewishness and to draw strength from an awareness of its links with the Jewish nation as a whole, from working for the Jewish present and from its faith in a Jewish future.' 72 This activity would also include vocational training for youngsters in preparation for their emigration abroad. Mention was also made of the need to develop an independent cultural life. The authors' intention was to strengthen the sense of the uniqueness of the Jewish heritage, as a counterweight against edicts, which brought shame and disgrace. But this manifesto also clarified an additional change in the basic current of their thinking; for generations Jews had aspired to an integration of their tradition with the culture in which they lived, whereas at this point their first consideration was to encourage activities in the sphere of Jewish education.
The stand adopted by the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) vis-a-vis emigration, which became the most important issue for German Jewry, is of particular interest. This is what the Representation had to say on this score in September 1935: 'The increased necessity for emigration obliges us to undertake planning on a large scale, directing candidates primarily to Palestine, but also to other countries where possible. This refers to youth in particular... in addition to this it must be our concern... to create possibilities for liquidating the property of independent businessmen and transferring their funds abroad.' Does this passage indicate that a change had occurred in the attitude of the National Representation, which had not encouraged large numbers of Jews to leave Germany until then? It is difficult to reach a clear-cut conclusion on the basis of these sentences alone and the subject requires more extensive examination. It should be noted at this point that the report of the central institutions of German Jewry for the year 1935 states that the Nuremberg Laws led to an "enormous increase" in the drive to emigrate. 73 This would seem to indicate that the warning signs inherent in the Nuremberg Laws had been correctly read by the Jewish public, and that many had sought to leave Germany in good time. Similarly, a number of small companies sprang up and expanded at that time, offering their services as regards settlement in Cyprus, Latin America and other foreign countries 74 . In what way did the leaders of the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) react to this awakening temigration? They do not seem to have been prepared for the new development and had not crystallised a policy of their own in advance. Instead, they decided to lend their support to Max Warburg's plan, adding supplements to fit their own views. A manifesto along these lines was submitted by the National Representation to the German Ministry of Economics in January 1936 75 . It concentrated on the problem of transferring emigrants' property out of Germany, claiming that the smooth functioning of this aspect would determine whether it was possible to organise a systematic emigration movement. It was claimed that this also required the establishment of enterprises providing vocational training on a large scale in order to prepare candidates for settling abroad.
Nevertheless, while examining this subject it becomes clear that the manifesto was also designed to protest the dispossession of German Jewry. The authorities were requested to put an end to the arbitrary interference of those who would undermine Jewish livelihoods, thus damaging their ability to plan emigration on a large scale. It transpires, therefore, that even while conducting negotiations on the subject of emigration, the leaders of the Representation did not waive their demand to guarantee the Jews' material existence as long as they were still in Germany. On the other hand, they were most cautious not to quote any figures as to planned emigration. Neither in the manifesto, nor during the negotiations which followed, were any figures disclosed, obviously with the intention of preventing the authorities from obtaining any information which could be used to expel Jews from Germany. 76
The direct negotiations with the Ministry of Economics began on January 29, 1936 77 . The delegation sent by the Representation consisted of its most senior members, Otto Hirsch, Max Warburg and Siegfried Moses. Georg Landauer from Jerusalem also participated in the negotiations. During the discussions it became clear that the organised Jewish community had not succeeded in drawing up an agreed platform. Sharp differences of opinion were evident between Max Warburg and Georg Landauer, the spokesman of the Zionist camp. It would seem that Landauer thought in terms appropriate to the operation of the "Transfer Company" and the absorption needs of German immigrants in Palestine 78 ; consequently, he regarded as most exaggerated the foreign currency figures cited in the manifesto as being necessary for emigrants abroad 79 . Warburg, on the other hand, at whose instigation these calculations had been made, upheld the idea of widespread emigration abroad, not only to Palestine. He thought that it would be impossible to open the gates for immigrants to South America and other countries throughout the world without immense financial investments. This internal dispute, which was conducted in the presence of the Ministry of Economics officials, cannot have done much towards finding a solution for the real problem, namely, planning a large movement of emigration by Jews from the area controlled by the Third Reich. The question arises whether the members of the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) were in actual fact interested in this.
The doubt is augmented further if one pays close attention to a long and detailed report, extending to fourteen pages, which was sent in March 1936 to the Council for German Jewry in London 80 . The memorandum opens with demographic figures showing that German Jewry at that time numbered 438,000 individuals according to the following distribution: 240,000 aged 45 or younger; 110,000 aged between 45 and 60; and 88,000 over the age of 60. It was stated that only 220,000 drawn from the 6-45 age group, were appropriate for a "constructive solution." However, according to estimates drawn up by the National Representation, the number of candidates for emigration in the near future was far lower, amounting to between 40,000 and 50,000 persons. In the course of time these were likely to be joined by another 70,000 candidates who were suitable as regards age. According to these figures, the number of candidates for emigration would not be more than 120,000 in all, and almost certainly even fewer. The authors of the memorandum, keeping to the minimalist approach, which is reflected in these figures, claimed that the emigration could be only ΓÇ£in a gradual manner" ( allmaehlich ). There appears to have been a close connection between this contention and their comment, that most of the potential candidates for emigration 'still have jobs, which provide a living for them and their families.' 81
The most striking expression of this attitude can be found in the introduction to the Berlin Community's budget for 1935: 'The idea of emigration is becoming increasingly prominent today. The trend towards reducing the number of Jews through emigration reflects the wishes of influential bodies in the State. It also accords with the desires of a large part of German Jewry as a result of the new legislation.' The passage continues as follows: 'It is generally agreed that a considerable number of Jews will be unable to leave Germany,' adding that it would be necessary to help those who remain. 82 It should be noted at this point that even as great an authority as Bernhard Kahn, the Joint Organisation's representative in Paris, expressed a similar opinion. He believed that although the Jews of Germany were obliged to profess their support for emigration, in actual fact most of them would have to continue residing in Germany for dozens of years 83 .
While there was no change in the attitude of the National Representation on this point, it was precisely at this period that they began to strengthen their relations with Jewish organisations throughout the world, seeking support from Jewish communities outside Germany. A sense of association with the Yishuv in Palestine and with the Jews of Britain and the U.S.A. fortified the National Representation in carrying out its tasks. 'The feelings of fraternal solidarity and the generous assistance of world Jewry have given the Jews of Germany solace in their hour of need, constituting a source of renewed strength, encouragement and bravery which has enabled them to continue to bear the heavy burden of their efforts to help themselves.' 84 The content of this passage, and the final phrase in particular, is highly instructive, since mention is made here of both the material and psychological support extended by their brethren abroad and the fact that the underlying principle of their activities was their desire to help themselves. It is patently clear that they carefully avoided presenting an image of poor relations passively waiting for salvation from their wealthy cousins. When they travelled to London for meetings of the Council for German Jewry, or to Paris or New York for consultations with leaders of the Joint Organisation, they did not look for patrons who would make decisions for them, but for loyal associates. Even though they fully appreciated the financial contributions raised for them by English and American Jewry, they nonetheless aspired to establishing their relations with them on a basis of equality and mutual respect. 85 In crystallising their reaction to the Nuremberg Laws, the leaders of the National Representation (Reichsvertretung) did not act in isolation from Jewish leadership in other countries. On the contrary, as a result of the events of September 1935, the contact between them was closer than it had ever been before. On many occasions ideas were exchanged between Otto Hirsch, Siegfried Moses and Max Warburg on the one hand, and the Jewish leaders gathered in London on the other 86 , but in the final analysis they took their own conclusions, which differed from the suggestions raised by Herbert Samuel, Simon Marks and their associates, who at that time supported "large-scale emigration." 87 Not only did they differ as regards principles but also concerning methods. Whereas the Council for German Jewry outlined a program of action for the ensuing four years, the members of the Representation preferred in the light of thcurrent vicissitudes, to adopt a more short-term policy, in accordance with the needs of the moment. 88
The Nuremberg Laws put an end to the emancipation of German Jewry and were framed with the express intention of subjecting Jews to degradation. Their promulgation did not, however, lead to any dramatic alteration in Jewish life. In effect the laws merely gave official sanction for a situation which had gradually been developing ever since Hitler's rise to power. As early as the summer of 1935 Jews had finally been prohibited from joining the newly emerging German army, thus effectively being prevented from enjoying equal civil rights. It was apparent that the government sought to isolate them from the rest of the population, but no clear-cut conclusion could be drawn from the racial laws as to whether Jews would be prevented from residing in Germany. On the contrary, official spokesmen made statements testifying that the Reichstag's decision at Nuremberg was designed to determine what would henceforth be the Jews' sphere of existence within the Third Reich.
The attitude of the Jewish organisations was influenced to a considerable extent by the fact that the new legislation neither contained limitations regarding their livelihood, nor restricted the sphere of activities of their autonomous institutions, nor even impaired the position of the Community as a legally recognised official body serving as the backbone of the Jewish population. It was for these reasons that most of the organisations did not regard the legislation of September 15, 1935 as signalling the fact that the government intended to force the Jews to leave Germany in massive numbers. They believed that they would be allowed to remain in Germany as a separate minority group.
They were strengthened in this view by three things: a While at the beginning of 1935 there had been another outburst of violence by SA and SS troops (for example, in Munich in May, at the Kurfuerstendamm and other places in July), close to the period when the Nuremberg Laws were passed the German Government restrained the rioters and put a stop to the wave of anti-Semitic terror. b As is well known, the Nuremberg Laws were accompanied by placating explanations on the part of government representatives, some of which have been cited above. Today, in retrospect, it is obvious to us that these were simply part of the policy of fraudulent deception practised by the rulers of the Third Reich. At that time, nevertheless, they misled the leaders of German Jewry as regards the government's objectives, encouraging them to believe that it really wanted to solve their problems. c The Winter Olympics were to begin at Garmisch-Partenkirchen in February 1936, just a few months after the Reichstag's decision at Nuremberg. Throughout this period the government was preparing for the massive rally at which it wanted to present to the world an image of a peaceful and moderate state with good intentions. For this reason, instructions were issued by the German Government forbidding unofficial activities ( Einzelaktionen ) directed against the Jews. Signs distinguishing non-Aryan stores were removed, as were notices forbidding Jews entry to vacation sites and certain villages in Frankonia. It seemed as if henceforth the rule of law and order would be observed as regarding the relations between Germans and Jews.
We have indicated the reasons why Jewish leaders did not realise that under the existing government the further deterioration of their situation would be inevitable. There is, however, no cause for assuming that in the autumn of 1935 they were imbued with a spirit of optimism. The attitude of their organisation was characterised primarily by a deep sense of uncertainty as to what was to come and how to confront the dangers of an uneasy future. Thus the promulgation of the Nuremberg Laws though unmistakably pointing towards the decline of German Jewry, did not ma decisive turn in the course of its policy versus the National Socialist Government.
References:
61 J.R., 4.2.1936, p. 2.
62 See, for instance, the article ΓÇ£Kultur-Autonomie als Loesung,ΓÇ¥ in J.R., 12.5.1933.
63 Hans Gaertner in J.R., 7.2.1936.
64 J.R., 4.2.1936.
65 See, for instance, J.R., 6.6.1935; 7.5.1935.
66 J.R., 7.2.1936.
67 J.R., 24.9.1935.
68 C.V.-Z., 26.9.1935; J.R., 17.9.1935.
69 See the protest of the Reichsvertretung against false charges of the Stuermer of April 26, 1934, GFOC, AA Neue Reichskanzlei, Juedische Angelegenheiten, YVA, JM/2462; see also the protest of the Reichsvertretung against the defamations of Goebbels, May 15, 1934, ALBI, LΓÇô1431, E 612042ΓÇô44.
70 Informationsblaetter im Auftrage des Zentralausschusses fuer Hilfe und Aufbau der Juden in Deutschland , Berlin, Jg. 2, No. 6, 27.8.1934.
71 See note 41.
72 J.R., 24.9.1935.
73 Arbeitsbericht des Zentralausschusses fuer Hilfe und Aufbau, 1935, p. 26.
74 J.R., 13.11.1935.
75 Eingabe R.V., CZA, S 25/9810.
76 Landauer's report, January 31, 1936, CZA, S 25/9810.
77 Ibid.
78 Landauer was one of the initiators of the Transfer Agreement, and after his immigration to Palestine acted as the director of ΓÇ£The Office for the Settlement of German Jews in Palestine.ΓÇ¥
79 The authors of the manifesto fixed the sum of 250,000,000 RM.
80 The report was sent on March 16, 1936, under the title ΓÇ£Juedische Auswanderung aus Deutschland und deren VorbereitungΓÇ¥ (hereafter ΓÇô Auswanderung Vorbereitung ΓÇôRV), CZA, S 25/9810.
81Ibid.
82 Geleitwort zum Etat 1936; Juedische Gemeinde, Berlin, Gemeindevorstand.
83 Bernhard Kahn's letter to J. S. Hyman, The Joint Archives, New York, Section 1934ΓÇô1939 ΓÇô Germany general.
84 See Auswanderung Vorbereitung-RV, CZA, S 25/9810.
85 Ibid.
86 Rosenblueth's reports to Landauer on December 13, 19 and 20, 1935; Rosenblueth's report to Marks, December 29, 1935.
87 Central Fund for German Jewry, German Jewry ΓÇô A Four Year Plan of Emigration (from the end of December 1935), CZA, S 25/9810.
